CBDCs in a High-Evasion Economy: Seigniorage, Tax Collection, and Institutional Tensions
- Title
- CBDCs in a High-Evasion Economy: Seigniorage, Tax Collection, and Institutional Tensions
- Creator
- Kaur, Harpreet; Srivastava, Surbhi; Singh, Shanu
- Description
- This chapter investigates the welfare implications of introducing Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) in an economy with tax evasion and varying degrees of central bank independence (CBI). The model considers scenarios with and without central bank independence, where the fiscal authority finances its expenditure through sales tax and/or seigniorage revenue from the central bank. The model analyses the equilibrium conditions for the coexistence of cash and CBDC, and it depends on the degree of CBI. 2026 by IGI Global Scientific Publishing. All rights reserved.
- Source
- Policy Implications on International Financial Economics and Banking;pp.237-264
- Date
- 01-01-2025
- Publisher
- IGI Global
- Coverage
- Kaur H., Christ University, India; Srivastava S., Christ University, India; Singh S., Christ University, Delhi, India
- Rights
- Restricted Access; Hardcopy may be available in the library
- Relation
- ISBN: 979-833733727-2; 979-833733725-8;
- Format
- online
- Language
- English
- Type
- Book chapter
Collection
Citation
Kaur, Harpreet; Srivastava, Surbhi; Singh, Shanu, “CBDCs in a High-Evasion Economy: Seigniorage, Tax Collection, and Institutional Tensions,” CHRIST (Deemed To Be University) Institutional Repository, accessed June 18, 2026, https://archives.christuniversity.in/items/show/24758.
