Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Faculty Publications Conference Paper Faculty Publications- Conference Papers Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Rakesh, V.S.; Vijayan, Alpha; Ramalakshmi, K.; Ravi, G.H.; Santhrupth, B.C.; Varalakshmi, K.V. Title A name given to the resource D-GRAM: Dynamic Game-Theoretic Risk Modeling for Adaptive Cyber Defense Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 01-01-2025 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived 2025 5th International Conference on Emerging Research in Electronics, Computer Science and Technology, ICERECT 2025; Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/ICERECT65215.2025.11377331" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://doi.org/10.1109/ICERECT65215.2025.11377331</a> <br /><br /><a href="https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105034907197?origin=resultslist" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105034907197?origin=resultslist</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Rakesh V.S., Cambridge Institute of Technology, K R Puram, Bengaluru, India; Vijayan A., Christ University, Department of Aiml &amp; Ds, Bengaluru, India; Ramalakshmi K., Cambridge Institute of Technology, K R Puram, Bengaluru, India; Ravi G.H., Cambridge Institute of Technology, K R Puram, Bengaluru, India; Santhrupth B.C., Christ University, Department of Aiml &amp; Ds, Bengaluru, India; Varalakshmi K.V., Cambridge Institute of Technology, K R Puram, Bengaluru, India Description An account of the resource Cybersecurity threats are increasing in scale and sophistication, requiring strategic decision-making for cost-effective defense. This work presents a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework to model the interaction between a rational attacker and a defender with limited resources. Each player selects from a finite set of strategies, and payoffs are computed dynamically based on the probability of attack success, defense cost, and potential impact. A loss-risk relationship is used to populate the payoff matrix, ensuring that outcomes reflect realistic operational conditions. A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is calculated to determine optimal attack and defense probabilities, thereby balancing resource use and risk mitigation. To improve practicality, an adaptive defense mechanism is introduced, allowing the defender to update strategy probabilities incrementally based on observed attacker behavior. Sensitivity analysis reveals how equilibrium strategies adjust in response to variations in attack cost, defense cost, and impact severity. The results highlight how adaptive learning enhances resilience while minimizing unnecessary defense efforts, making the approach suitable for resource-constrained network environments. 2025 IEEE. Subject The topic of the resource Adaptive defense; Cybersecurity modeling; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Risk analysis Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. Relation A related resource ISBN: 979-833153200-0; Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource Conference paper Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Restricted Access; Hardcopy may be available in the library Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource online